A recent proposal suggests that using two 56-bit keys but enciphering 3 times (encrypt with a first key, decrypt with a second key, then encrypt with the first key again) increases security over simple double encryption. This paper shows that although either technique significantly improves security over single encryption, the new technique does not significantly increase security over simple double encryption. Cryptanalysis of the ll2-bit key requires about 256 operations and words of memory, using a chosen plaintext attack. While DES is used as an example, the technique is applicable to any similar cipher.
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This work was supported under NSF Grants ENG 10173 and ELS encryption using independent keys can increase the strength of DES. But, as noted in [2] , the increase in security can be far less than might first appear.
Double Encryption
The simplest approach to increasing the key size is to encrypt twice, with two independent keys K1 and K2. Letting P be a 64-bit plaintext, C a 64-bit ciphertext, and K a 56-bit key, the basic DES encryption operation can be represented as
and simple double encryption is obtained as
While exhaustive search over all 2112 keys (K1-K2 pairs) requires 2 nz operations and is clearly infeasible, this cipher can be broken under a known plaintext attack (where corresponding plaintext and ciphertext are both known) with 256 operations, and 2 ~6 words of memory [2] . The time required is therefore no greater than is needed to cryptanalyze a single 56-bit key exhaustively (although there is very significant additional cost for memory). If P and C represent a known plaintext--ciphertext pair, then the algorithm for accomplishing this [2] encrypts P under all 256 possible values of K1, decrypts C under all 256 values of K2, and looks for a match. For obvious reasons, this is called a "meet in the middle" attack; it is given in detail by the following algorithm (where n is the number of keys in the key space; for DES, n = 256): Unicity distance arguments [4, 11 ] indicate that step (3a) will produce about 248 false alarms: each of the 64 bits of known plaintext corresponds to one binary equation (bit of redundancy) and there are 112 binary unknowns (the bits of the key). Unicity distance arguments therefore predict 2112"64 = 248 false alarms. A similar argument indicates that 64 bits of additional known plaintext suffices to reduce the overall false alarm rate at step (3b) to 24s64 = 2 -16, which is small.
While sorting causes the above algorithm to run in time n logn, it could be rewritten using hash tables to run in essentially linear time. In any event, the present analysis will neglect logarithmic factors.
The use of double encryption provides an increase in security because the algorithm for cryptanalysis requires [2] to be about $20 million. The cost of 256 64-bit words of memory on 6250 cpi reels of magnetic tape, assuming 2400 foot reels that cost $20 each, is about $80 billion.
While the cost of implementing this search is high enough to prevent its use today, the danger of cheaper technology or shortcuts [5] in the future prompted Diffie and Hellman to suggest triple encryption with three independent keys, K1, K2, and K3. A generalized meet in the middle attack would then require 2112 operations and be well beyond the foreseeable technology for at least 50 years, and possibly forever.
Triple Encryption
At the 1978 National Computer Conference, Tuchman [12] proposed a triple encryption method which uses only two keys, K1 and K2. The plaintext is encrypted with K1, decrypted with K2, then again encrypted with K 1, so that
C = SK,{S~[SKa(P)]).

(3)
This method seems to avoid the "meet in the middle" attack outlined above and is upwardly compatible with a single encryption by setting K1 = K2 to produce
This allows users of the new (two key) system to decrypt data encrypted by users of the old (single key) system. While the encryption technique (3) provides more security than simple double encryption as in (2), the new method can still be cryptanalyzed using a chosen plaintext attack [3] with about 2 56 operations and 2 56 words of memory. We therefore recommend that if triple encryption is used there be three independent keys. If compatibility with single encryption is desired, the operation can be taken to be
Then, when K1 = K2 = K3 = K, C = SK(P). Users could also be compatible with Tuchman's suggested method (4) by taking K1 = K3. Although chosen plaintext attacks can sometimes be mounted on real systems, the following cryptanalysis of Tuchman's proposal should be viewed as a "certificational attack" which is only indicative of a weakness. Use of DES in accordance with proposed federal standards effectively prevents use of a chosen plaintext attack. History, littered with the broken remains of "unbreakable" ciphers, teaches extreme caution in certifying a new one [6] , so that today, even an indication of weakness is regarded as dangerous. In many cases, ciphers which have yielded to chosen plaintext attacks have later proven vulnerable to known plaintext or ci- phertext only attacks as well. We define some useful notation before describing the method of cryptanalysis:
S~I(C).
M1 and M2 are intermediate values in the computation of C from P, as shown in Figure 1 . We motivate the method of cryptanalysis with the following observations:
If we knew K1 and a P-C pair, then it would be possible to compute the intermediate values MI and M2 from (7) and (10) . This would let us mount a known plaintext attack on K2 using (8). There are 256 values of K1, so/f we could quickly determine the right K2 once we found the right K1, then cryptanalysis would only take 2 56 operations to search over K1. However, determining K2 using a known plaintext attack requires 256 operations and would result in complexity 2112 .
The trick is to change the known plaintext attack on K2 to a chosen plaintext attack (that is, M1 is chosen), so we can quickly find K2 with a table lookup based on M2. This increases the memory needed to 2 56 words, the same as is needed by the meet in the middle attack for simple double encryption.
For this attack to work, we must find the plaintext P0 which results in M1 = 0. Equation (7) implies P0 ---S~,~ (0), so deciphering M1 = 0 under all 256 values of K1 is guaranteed to produce P0. For each P = ST1(0) we therefore request Enc(P) = C (by the chosen plaintext assumption); compute S~-I(C) = 37/2; and compute I(2 in one step from h7/2 using the precomputed table. Since there are 256 64-bit values in the table, unicity distance arguments indicate a false alarm rate of 2 -8 per value of K1 tried, or 248 overall. Again, a single additional plaintext-ciphertext pair suffices to rule these out. The additional effort required is negligible compared to the basic search over 256 Kl's Because Po = S~1~(0) and the corresponding M2 = S~1(0) the algorithm can proceed as follows (Note: 37/2 in step (la) serves as both M2 from (8) and as Po from (7)). 
C
Conclusion
A second method of multiple encryption has been shown to be less secure than it first appeared. The weakness in both cases came from an ability to separate the key into two halves which did not interact. We conclude that all bits of the key should come into play repeatedly in a complex fashion as they do in the 56-bit DES and that multiple encryption with any cryptographic system is liable to be much less secure than a system designed originally for the longer key.
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